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Summary 
This mimeo provides a literature review of corporate income taxation. The results 
in the literature are then used to try to understand the most likely implications of 
a Finnish corporate income tax rate cut in 2014. The literature identifies a 
number of margins that respond to corporate income taxation and suggests that 
profit-shifting and investment decisions are the most important decision margins 
for the corporate income tax base of a country. These margins are also the most 
relevant internationally as they make corporate tax bases interact across 
countries. From a government perspective the tax base responses are of great 
importance, because tax revenue diverges from that suggested by a static budget 
calculation. 
A corporate income tax cut is likely to increase the corporate tax base in the 
home country, but it is also likely to decrease corporate tax bases abroad. Thus a 
reduction in tax revenue is partially offset by a larger tax base. Part of this 
offsetting is, however, at the expense of other countries. The interaction between 
countries’ tax bases encourages countries to enter into strategic considerations 
and to cut their corporate tax rates. Both of these have also been observed 
empirically. 
Finland implemented a change in the corporate income tax rate from 24.5% to 
20% in the beginning of 2014. According to empirical estimates shown in the 
literature, about 50% of the tax revenue decrease following this tax rate cut is 
likely to be offset by behavioral responses. We point out a few caveats regarding 
these results. First, the empirical estimates are only approximations of the true 
effects and these effects may also differ across countries. Second, changes in the 
corporate income tax rate may also have equilibrium effects influencing prices, 
wages, hours of work, consumption and so on. These may affect the tax base 
responses to the tax rate change. For instance, if the tax rate change also 
increases hours worked, then the tax base increase is larger than when this effect 
is ignored. The equilibrium effects are beyond the scope of this mimeo. 
  
 
Yhteenveto 
Tässä muistiossa tehdään kirjallisuuskatsaus yritysverotusta koskevaan 
taloustieteelliseen kirjallisuuteen ja pyritään tämän valossa arvioimaan Suomen 
yhteisöveron laskemisen mahdollisia seurauksia. Yritysverokirjallisuus tunnistaa 
useita eri tapoja, joilla yritykset reagoivat yhteisöveron muutoksiin. Näistä 
tärkeimpiä ovat voitonsiirrot ja ulkomaiset suorat investoinnit, jotka ovat myös 
kansainvälisesti merkittävimmät, koska näiden välityksellä eri maiden yritys-
veropohjat ovat yhteydessä toisiinsa. Valtion kannalta veropohjamuutokset ovat 
tärkeitä, koska niiden vuoksi verotulot poikkeavat staattisen laskelman 
mukaisista verotuloista. 
Samalla kun yhteisöveron lasku tyypillisesti kasvattaa kotimaista yhteisö-
veropohjaa ja rahoittaa näin itseään takaisin, se myös pienentää ulkomaisia 
yhteisöveropohjia. Veropohjan kasvu, joka tapahtuu osittain muiden maiden 
kustannuksella, kannustaa valtioita yhteisöverokannan strategiseen käyttämiseen. 
Tällaisesta strategisesta käyttäytymisestä, verokilpailusta maiden välillä onkin 
olemassa selkeää näyttöä. 
Suomessa yhteisöveroaste laski vuoden 2014 alusta 24,5 prosentista 20 
prosenttiin. Taloustieteellisen kirjallisuuden tarjoamien estimaattien valossa 
veroasteen laskemisen itserahoitusaste olisi noin 50 prosenttia. Tuloksen taustalla 
on syytä huomioida seuraavat asiat: Empiiriset arviot sisältävät epävarmuutta, ja 
lisäksi ne voivat poiketa maittain. Yhteisöveroasteen laskemisella voi myös olla 
tasapainovaikutuksia, joiden vuoksi esimerkiksi hinnat, palkat, työtunnit ja 
kulutus voivat muuttua. Näiden seurauksena yhteisöveron muutoksen vaikutukset 
voivat muuttaa muotoaan merkittävästi. Jos esimerkiksi yhteisöveron muutos 
aiheuttaa myös työtuntien lisääntymistä, kasvaa veropohja enemmän kuin silloin, 
kun tämä on jätetty huomiotta. Tällaiset tasapainovaikutukset on jätetty tämän 
muistion ulkopuolelle. 
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1 Introduction     
 
Taxes on corporate income are important revenue sources for many countries. Their share of 
tax revenue is on average around 8% in the OECD countries. In spite of this ability to generate 
revenue, the taxes have been accused of introducing distortions to behavior. These distortions 
are believed to cause substantial revenue and welfare losses. Economic research has shown 
that these problems are likely to be present in a closed economy (no cross-border activity), but 
that they are particularly complex and important in an open economy context where 
multinational companies have a prominent role.    
The goal of this report is to review the literature concerning the effects of corporate taxes in 
an international environment. The report discusses the relevant tax rules and shows how they 
are likely to affect the behavior of both firms and countries. The focus is, nevertheless, on 
reviewing the results and approaches of recent empirical research in the subject area. The 
report was produced for the National Audit Office as a subproject of a larger research project 
evaluating the effects of recent changes in capital income and corporate taxation in Finland.1         
The report starts (chapter 2) by characterizing the central aspects of corporate tax systems in a 
national and international context. It then demonstrates (chapter 3) the potential behavioral 
implications of tax rules using a simple model of a multinational enterprise (MNE). It highlights 
how taxes can affect financing decisions and decisions on where to locate investment and 
profits in an international environment. Chapter 4 provides a survey of the empirical evidence 
of these effects.  Chapter 5 summarizes.   
 
  
                                                            
1 Contract between the National Audit Office of Finland, ETLA and VATT: Yhteisö- ja pääomaverotuksen 
dynaamisia vaikutuksia koskeva tutkimus, 15./21.10.2013. 
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2 Taxation of business income – central institutions 
 
All developed countries levy corporate taxes on the net income of incorporated business firms. 
While some countries have introduced rules that take into account the relationships between 
the units of a corporate group, the prevailing practice is still that corporate tax is paid by every 
incorporated legal entity regardless of whether it is a subsidiary of a corporate group or an 
independent company. This is called the principle of separate accounting (SA).2  
The tax base of corporate tax is usually net business profit, i.e. gross profit minus business 
expenses including debt costs. Investment expenses are deducted using schematic 
depreciation rules. Similarly, special rules apply to inventory accounting and loss-offsetting. 
Dividends from an affiliate in the same corporate group are usually tax-exempt, as may be 
capital gains from the sale of shares. Despite some international coordination, individual 
countries have wide autonomy in defining both the base and rate of corporate taxation. As a 
consequence, corporate tax systems differ much in detail across countries.  
In an international environment where investors and companies operate across borders, many 
obvious questions arise. How is cross-border income taxed? Which country has the primary 
entitlement to tax profits? How is the potential problem of double taxation solved?  
The current practice, guided by the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital and 
implemented in bilateral tax treaties, can be illustrated by distinguishing between two basic 
principles. Under the source principle, a country is permitted to tax all income that arises 
within its geographical borders, whether such income accrues to residents or to foreigners. 
The other is the residence principle, which recognizes the right to tax all income accruing to 
domestic residents whether from domestic or foreign sources. Hence residence-based taxation 
taxes the worldwide income of domestic residents. 
Current international agreements grant source countries prior entitlement to tax business 
income from permanent establishments of firms operating within their borders. This, together 
with the fact that residence countries of MNEs usually exempt foreign-source corporate 
income (exemption method), means that the current practice, especially in Europe, is close to 
the source principle: profits of affiliates of MNEs are taxed primarily or only in the countries 
where those affiliates are located. Very few countries apply residence-based taxation, i.e. tax 
the worldwide profits of domestic MNEs and provide relief for double taxation by crediting 
foreign taxes against domestic tax on that income (credit method). In Table 1 we list the tax 
treatment of foreign-source dividends in 15 countries in 1991, 2005 and 2012. We observe 
that all countries except Ireland and the USA apply the exemption method. Within the time 
span several countries have switched from credit to exemption.   
                                                            
2 The opposite of separate accounting, unitary taxation (UT), treats corporate groups as single entities. 
One variant of UT is where the corporate group calculates its aggregate worldwide profit and apportions 
it to host countries based on an apportionment formula. Each country then levies taxes on its portion of 
the aggregate tax base at its own tax rate. State-level corporate taxation in the USA and Canada is based 
on UT and the European Commission has launched a proposal that would allow multinational firms to 
opt for UT for taxation of their Europe-wide profits.   
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As for personal income, international agreements assign the entitlement to tax to countries of 
residence. This applies to wages, dividends and income earned on financial and intangible 
assets in particular. Hence, the source principle is mostly applied to the taxation of productive 
activity and the residence principle to the taxation of individual-level wage and capital income.    
Table 1. Treatment of foreign source dividends received by parent companies in selected 
countries  
Country 1991 2005 2012 Change  
Denmark Exemption Exemption Exemption - 
Finland Exemption Exemption Exemption - 
Iceland Credit Exemption Exemption X 
Norway Credit Exemption Exemption X 
Sweden Exemption Exemption Exemption - 
 
France Exemption Exemption Exemption - 
Germany Exemption Exemption Exemption - 
Ireland Credit Credit Credit - 
Italy Credit Exemption Exemption X  
Poland Credit Credit Exemption X  
Spain  Credit Exemption Exemption X  
United Kingdom Credit Credit Exemption X  
 
Canada Exemption Exemption Exemption - 
Japan Credit Credit Exemption X  
United States Credit Credit Credit - 
Sources: ZEW (2012): Effective Tax Levels Using the Devereux/Griffith Methodology, Final Report 2012, 
Project for the EU Commission TAXUD/2008/CC/009, and OECD (1991): Taxing Profits in a Global 
Economy, OECD, Paris. 
One requirement for being able to enforce the source principle is the existence of some rules 
to guide the allocation of the worldwide profits of MNEs to the various countries where the 
MNE operates. The current practice relies on a combination of separate accounts and the so-
called arm’s length principle, which requires transactions between the various units of a MNE 
to be priced in the same way as transactions between unrelated parties. It is up to national tax 
laws to specify how arm’s length prices are determined. Proper reference prices are often 
difficult to obtain, and therefore the system may leave corporations with considerable scope 
for profit-shifting using over- or under-invoicing of internal transactions.   
While source-based taxation of corporate profits can be implemented by exempting foreign 
profits when repatriated to the residence country (parent company’s residence), the residence 
principle is satisfied when the residence country credits foreign taxes against domestic tax on 
worldwide income. In the latter case, a large part of the total tax bill may be paid to the source 
country, but under pure credit the effective tax burden on foreign-source income is the same 
as on domestic income. Therefore residence-based taxation leads to equal taxation of business 
operations whether they are domestic or foreign, seen as an important advantage. However, 
the implementation of the principle is difficult and usually very incomplete in practice. Credit is 
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commonly limited to the amount of domestic tax, and worldwide income is defined to include 
only those foreign profits that are repatriated (credit with deferral). Therefore the equalization 
of tax rates on domestic and foreign operations does not necessarily occur. This implies that 
the system distorts location decisions of new investments and may create incentives to defer 
the repatriation of foreign profits.      
To summarize, the current system of international taxation of MNEs has the following stylized 
features. The system relies on the source principle, i.e. countries where affiliates of MNEs are 
located have the prior right to tax their profits and repatriated foreign profits are tax exempt in 
the residence country of the MNE. The allocation of profits of a MNE between the various 
locations of its operations is based on separate accounting and the arm’s length principle.  
These features have important implications for incentives and efficiency. A MNE can affect its 
total tax bill by changing the location of its production and other activities. It has also some 
leeway in affecting the allocation of its profits across its units in different locations. As we will 
see in the following chapters, these incentives may have dramatic behavioral implications. The 
pure residence principle would be free from these distortions.  
To avoid problems in their source-based tax systems, many countries have implemented 
regulations that can be interpreted as steps towards the residence principle. One such element 
is so-called controlled foreign corporation legislation (CFC), which allows the residence country 
of an MNE to tax income reported by an affiliate in a low-tax jurisdiction as if the income 
originated in the residence country. A typical condition is that this income can be considered 
as “passive income” indicating tax-planning motives. CFC rules have been implemented by 
most OECD countries, including Finland. Similarly, a large number of countries apply so-called 
thin capitalization and income-stripping rules to constrain excessive interest payments. Debt 
costs are normally tax-deductible, so they may serve well as a profit-shifting vehicle. While thin 
capitalization rules create a ceiling for the debt-to-assets ratio, income-stripping rules establish 
a ceiling for interest payments compared to gross operating profit.3 
 
  
                                                            
3 The report “Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” (BEPS) released by the OECD in February 2013 
started a project which aims at reforming the existing international tax framework. Its action plan, of 
July 2013, contains 15 measures including a plan of model tax rules to restrict interest deductions and to 
strengthen the national CFC rules.  
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3 Incentive effects of corporate taxation   
 
In this section we introduce a conceptual framework to discuss the central incentive 
implications of domestic and international tax rules applying to corporate taxation. Our 
approach is to set up a model of an MNE and derive the conditions for various decisions 
relating to the MNE’s intensive margin. Due to the limits of the model framework, some 
important decisions along the extensive margin are left out, such as the location choice of a 
subsidiary and change of domicile of the MNE. We also touch on the welfare implications of 
the effects dealt with and outline some optimal policy choices from the point of view of a 
single jurisdiction.  The model follows the approach of Fuest et al. (2005).     
Consider a bi-national MNE that consists of a parent company, resident in the home country 
(h-country), and a subsidiary, operating in a foreign country (f-country). The parent produces 
at home using h-country capital Kh as the only production factor. Similarly, the subsidiary 
produces abroad using foreign capital Kf. Let Yh=F(Kh) be production at home and Yf=F(Kf) 
production abroad (with standard properties). Capital is mobile between the countries.  
The firm finances investments with debt ܤ and equity ܧ. Therefore, the stock of capital is 
Ki=Bi+Ei,  i= h, f. The firm pays interest costs on debt at the exogenous rate r. Interest cost is 
deductible from the corporate tax base. The owner’s rate of return requirement on equity is r. 
The equity of the affiliate, Ef, is provided by the parent. 
The h-country collects corporate taxes at the rate τh and the f-country at the rate τf. Assume 
first that the two countries apply the exemption method to the taxation of repatriated foreign 
profits. Hence foreign profits are subject only to f-country corporate tax at the rate τf. Assume 
further that the parent can transfer profits to the subsidiary by manipulating the prices of 
intra-company trade in goods and services. Denote the transferred amount C. However, 
manipulating transfer prices causes the firm costs in terms of administrative burdens, 
inefficiency caused by distorted price signals and fines. We assume this cost, a(C), is non-
deductible, borne by the parent, and a convex function of the amount shifted, C.      
The reported profit of the parent company of the MNE net of taxes and costs of finance can 
now be written (rEh illustrates the opportunity cost of equity) 
(1) Ph =   F(Kh) – r(Bh+Eh) – C – a(C) – τh[F(Kh) – rBh – C]. (parent, h-country) 
The net profit of the subsidiary is: 
(2) Pf =   F(Kf) – rBf +  C – τf[F(Kf) – rBf + C].  (subsidiary, f-country) 
The MNE’s total net profit is given by P = Ph+ Pf. 
The effects on financing decisions 
Let us start the analysis of the effects of corporate taxation from the domestic financing 
decision. We consider this issue by deriving the cost of capital (i.e. the required pre-tax rate of 
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return) for two investment projects, one financed with equity and the other with debt. To do 
this, use Kh=Bh+Eh and differentiate Ph in (1) with respect to Eh and Bh to get:   
(3)    F’(KhE) = 
௥
ଵିఛ೓ ,     F’(K
h
B) = r      
We observe that the cost of capital for equity-financed investment is higher than the cost of 
debt. For equity-financed investments, taxation drives a wedge ωE between the interest rate r 
and the pre-tax return on investment. The size of this wedge is ωE = τhr/(1−τh) > 0. For debt ωB 
= 0. This difference follows from the asymmetric tax treatment of the costs of debt and equity. 
Debt is deductible from the tax base while the opportunity cost of equity is not. Hence 
conventional corporate tax provides incentives to finance investments with debt with the 
result that taxation distorts the firm’s capital structure. Since firms cannot rely only on debt in 
financing their investments,4 corporate tax also distorts investment.  
Many reform proposals have considered the so-called allowance for corporate equity (ACE) as 
a solution to the distortions discussed above (see e.g. Griffith et al, 2010). This proposal allows 
a firm to deduct the opportunity cost of equity (rE in our model) from the corporate tax base in 
the same way as it may deduct the realized costs of debt.  As a result the investment condition 
becomes F’(K) = r both for debt and equity.        
In a multinational environment an additional issue arises: in which country should the MNE 
issue debt? This is an important question when tax rates differ between countries. We address 
the issue by deriving the cost of capital for f-country investment financed by issuing debt in the 
h-country. We assume that funds collected in the h-country are transferred to the f-country in 
the form of equity. To analyze this policy, consider the effect of a marginal increase in Kf and Bh 
on P, while keeping the other variables constant. Assume the h-country tax rate is higher than 
the f-country tax rate. We get 
    F’(KfB) = 
ଵିఛ೓
ଵିఛ೑ ݎ < ݎ. 
The cost of capital is below the nominal cost of debt due to the asymmetry in the tax 
treatment between costs and returns. The cost reduction can be substantial if the difference in 
tax rates is large: 
 ݎ − ଵିఛ೓ଵିఛ೑ ݎ = 	
ఛ೓ିఛ೑
ଵିఛ೑ ݎ. 
Hence the current international tax system, where the source principle dominates and national 
tax rates vary greatly, creates substantial incentives to locate debt issues in high-tax countries.   
The effect on international investment  
                                                            
4 Finance literature explains this as follows: an increase in indebtedness increases the risk of costly 
bankruptcies and may also lead to interest conflicts between lenders and equity owners.  
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Let us make the model simpler by dropping the cost of finance and assuming that the 
aggregate stock of capital S=Kh+Kf is fixed. Differentiating P = Ph+ Pf with respect to Khand Kf 
gives the profit-maximizing investment condition in the case of source-based taxation: 
(4)  (1−τh)F’(Kh)  =  (1−τf)F’(Kf)  
Under the source principle the MNE equates the after-tax marginal product of capital. The 
condition defines the allocation of capital across the two countries. This implies that the size of 
the h-country capital stock Kh is a function of the domestic and foreign tax rates. Consider the 
effects of a change in policy, where the foreign tax rate τf decreases while the domestic tax 
rate stays constant. A cut in the foreign tax rate is followed by a flow of capital from home to 
abroad. This continues until equation (4) again is satisfied. In the new equilibrium Kh is lower 
and Kf  higher than before the tax-rate change.   
If we assume a pure residence principle, where foreign repatriated profits are subject to 
foreign tax credit at home, and, therefore, taxed effectively at the h-country tax rate τh, the 
investment condition becomes: 
(5) (1−τh)F’(Kh)  =  (1−τh)F’(Kf)      F’(Kh)  =  F’(Kf) 
Now the tax terms cancel out and the MNE equates the before-tax marginal products of 
capital. Taxation has in principle no effects on the allocation of capital between the countries. 
A tax rate change in the f-country has no effects on the capital stocks of the h- and f-countries. 
This neutrality implication also applies to the decision concerning the location of debt 
discussed above. The tax-motivated incentive to finance investments located in a low-tax 
country by issuing debt in a high-tax country vanishes despite the difference in tax rates.   
These considerations suggest that the distortions to investment produced by corporate 
taxation in an international context have their roots in the application of the source principle. 
Foreign income is exempt at home and therefore foreign tax rules determine the final tax 
burden of foreign-source income. If tax rates are low there, investors facing the incentive 
exploit the benefits of the low tax rate abroad.          
We can take a step further and use the model to outline some implications for optimal policy 
concerning the tax rate. Following Feldstein and Hartman (1979), assume that the h-country 
maximizes domestic income, i.e. the sum of domestic profit and repatriated foreign profit net 
of foreign taxes: 
(6) NI = F(Kh) + (1−τf)F(Kf)   
Maximizing this over τh gives the condition  
(7)  [F’(Kh) – (1−τf)F’(Kf)]డ௄೓డఛ೓   = 0. 
Since the partial derivative is in general non-zero, the bracketed term must be zero. By 
substituting (1−τf)F’(Kf) from condition (4), we obtain τh =0. Hence, under the source principle, 
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the h-country maximizes its national income by setting the domestic corporate tax at zero. This 
straightforward equilibrium result, widely discussed in literature, demonstrates the incentive 
effect faced by national governments when capital is mobile and tax systems are based on the 
source principle.5 
However, the source principle is not the only factor at fault for these incentives. To illustrate 
this, consider source-based taxation of foreign profits combined with an ACE deduction as 
discussed above. Return to the model with financing costs but abstract from debt financing 
and profit shifting. The ACE allowance exempts marginal investment of taxation and the 
international investment condition becomes  
(8)   F’(Kh)  =  F’(Kf). 
The tax terms vanish and the MNE equates the before-tax marginal returns on investment. As 
a result taxation does not distort the allocation of capital between countries. A further 
implication is that governments face no incentive to compete over tax rates. Hence the result 
suggests that even under the source principle we might get rid of distortions to the allocation 
of capital between countries if we allow firms to deduct the opportunity cost of equity from 
the tax base. However, as shown by Haufler and Schjelderup (2000), this favorable result relies 
on the assumption that there are no opportunities for shifting profits between countries. 
Besides, the result plausibly breaks down if we allow extensive margin decisions such as the 
location choice of a whole production plant. In this case it is no longer just the taxation of 
marginal investment that matters. Therefore the ACE allowance, which only affects marginal 
investment, is not a sufficient tool to grant neutrality.6          
Tax-motivated profit shifting between countries      
Let us move on and consider the original model, which includes the variable C, which models 
the amount of profits generated in the h-country but shifted to the f-country using intra-firm 
transfer prices. Profit-shifting is assumed to incur costs denoted a(C). To assess the incentive 
to shift profits, let us maximize P = Ph+ Pf over C. We get the following condition: 
(9) τh − τf  =  a’(C)   
The left-hand side gives the benefit in terms of saved taxes when 1 euro of domestic tax base 
is transferred to the f-country.  The right-hand side gives the marginal cost accruing to the 
MNE from shifting 1 euro of profits.  The condition implies that the firm shifts profits up to the 
point where the marginal saving per euro equals the marginal cost from shifting. If the h-
country tax rate is higher than the foreign tax rate, C takes a positive value.   
                                                            
5 For the same result in a broader model, including two tax instruments and a public goods provision, 
see Fuest and Huber (2002).  
6 The so-called CBIT model is another tax system that is sometimes seen as a partial solution to 
problems of corporate taxation (Bond, 2000). Under it the deductibility of debt costs is abolished. 
Therefore it may improve neutrality with respect to financing forms and abolish incentives for debt-
shifting. But it is no wholesale solution to other problems of source-based corporate taxes in an 
international environment.    
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The simple way to model profit-shifting used here, allowing a deduction C from one country’s 
tax base and adding the same amount to the other country’s tax base, is general and has no 
reference to actual practices. These practices may include e.g. manipulating transfer prices of 
internal trade in goods and services. They may also include intra-company financing decisions 
and relocating the MNE’s intangible assets (patents and other property rights) to low-tax 
countries.      
To consider the implications of profit-shifting from the point of view of national welfare, derive 
national income in the presence of profit-shifting:  
(10) NIS =  F(Kh) + (1−τf)F(Kf) – τfC – a(C) 
By comparing this expression to equation (6), we may conclude that profit-shifting reduces 
national income by cutting domestic tax revenue (term τfC) and incurring shifting costs (term 
a(C): assume they represent costs from tax-planning and reduced efficiency due to distorted 
price signals). This analysis is strongly simplified but suggests that measures to prevent 
income-shifting would improve h-country welfare. One potential source of effects neglected in 
the analysis is the possible effects via the domestic capital stock if returns are subject to a low 
foreign tax rate.  
We noted previously that source-based taxation does not provide firms with incentives for 
capital flight nor governments with any incentive to compete over corporate tax rates, if firms 
may deduct the opportunity cost of equity from the corporate tax base. We referred to the 
finding of Haufler and Schjelderup (2000) that this neutrality result assumes no profit-shifting 
and breaks down if firms can transfer profits between countries. The authors further show 
that, in that case, the socially optimal tax rates are positive (non-zero) but lower than in the 
absence of profit shifting.    
Summary of incentive effects caused by corporation tax  
Above we have briefly demonstrated that source-based conventional corporate taxation with 
separate accounting produces incentives for multinational firms to invest in and to shift profits 
to low-tax countries. We also showed that the conventional practice of allowing debt costs to 
be deductible from the tax base but not allowing deduction of the opportunity cost of debt 
distorts financing choices. In an international environment, it leads to locating debt issues in 
high-tax countries even when investments are made in low tax countries.    
We also outlined some aspects of the optimal policy of a single country. We demonstrated that 
when a country takes other countries’ taxation as given, the country maximizes its national 
income by reducing the domestic tax rate to zero. In the literature this result is also derived in 
a broader framework, which includes two production factors, one mobile (capital) and one 
immobile (labor), and several tax instruments. The zero-tax result is explained as follows. 
Immobile factors bear the burden of the tax on mobile factors. It is more efficient to tax 
immobile factors directly using, for example, labor taxation rather than levying tax on mobile 
capital.  
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We also stated that introducing an ACE model allowing deductibility of equity costs in taxation 
or switching to residence-based taxation do not represent solutions for individual countries. 
They may help, the latter option as a coordinated move, but they do not solve the incentive 
problems entirely. 
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4 Review of empirical results on the effects of corporate income 
taxation 
 
There is a vast literature studying the effects of corporate income taxation. This literature has 
considered - both theoretically and empirically - several behavioral margins that have been 
observed to respond to corporate income taxation. Profit-shifting and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) activities have been at the center of this discussion. 
If corporate income taxes had no effect on tax bases, there would be no distortions and the 
calculation of corporate tax revenues would be a more straightforward task. Empirical 
literature suggests, however, that corporate income taxes do have some dynamic implications. 
An increase in corporate income taxation is likely to erode the tax base, yet estimates of the 
magnitudes of these effects exhibit some variation. This variation may reflect differences 
between regions or countries (US states vs European countries) or between the aggregation 
level of the data (aggregate vs firm-level) or between some other dimensions of the data 
(cross-sections vs panel data) or the effects might differ at different points in time. 
De Mooij and Ederveen (2008; DE) study the corporate income tax (CIT) base responses to 
corporate income taxation. They review the empirical literature on semi-elasticities in the 
corporate tax base7 by considering five decision margins that have been observed to respond 
to corporate income taxation: the organizational form (incorporated vs non-corporate 
businesses), the financial form (debt vs equity), profit-shifting (shifting taxes to low-tax 
countries), intensive margin of investment (size of investment) and extensive margin of 
investment (location of investment). Their analysis tries to shed light on which of these 
margins are quantitatively the most important for the tax base. They split the aggregate semi-
elasticity (ߝ) of the tax base into five different parts with the aim of decomposing the overall 
effect into these components:8 
(11)                ߝ = ߝைி + ݓேߝ஽ா + ݓெߝ௉ௌ + ݓேߝூே௏ + ݓிߝ௅ை஼  
The first component in the DE decomposition, ߝைி, reflects the CIT base response to the 
change in the CIT rate caused purely by the distortion in the organizational form. The 
difference between the CIT and the personal income tax affects the decision of whether to 
incorporate the business or not. A lower CIT makes an incorporated business more attractive 
relative to a non-corporate business and vice versa. Therefore the expected sign of  ߝைி   is 
                                                            
7 Semi-elasticity measures the percentage change in the corporate tax base as a response to a one 
percentage point change in the tax measure. For example, when considering the organizational form, 
the relevant tax measure is the difference between the corporate income taxes and the personal 
income taxes, whereas for profit-shifting margin the relevant tax measure is the difference between tax 
rates of countries. 
8 The ݓ’s are included in the equation because the behavioral responses take place only in part of the 
corporate tax base in each margin. ݓேcorresponds to the share of normal return on equity in the total 
corporate tax base, which also comprises economic rents, ݓெ corresponds to the share of profits made 
by multinationals and , ݓி corresponds to the share of assets owned by foreigners. 
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negative and thus this choice is assumed to erode the corporate tax base when CIT is 
increased. 
For the empirical results regarding the choice of organizational form, DE refer to Goolsbee 
(2004) and De Mooij and Nicodème (2008). Both of these studies base their results on the 
estimation of models where the corporate share of business is explained by a measure of the 
relative taxation of corporate income (relative to personal income). Goolsbee (2004) employs 
state-level cross-sectional US data and reports semi-elasticity of −0.4, whereas De Mooij and 
Nicodème (2008) employ panel data on European Union member countries and report semi-
elasticity of −1.0. DE adopt the average of these two, −0.7 (ߝைி = −0.7), as their estimate for 
this semi-elasticity.9 The interpretation of this estimate is that a one percentage point increase 
in the CIT rate shifts part of what would otherwise be corporate income to non-corporate 
income and therefore reduces the corporate share of business and also the CIT base by 0.7  
percent. 
Other studies than those that are mainly interested in corporate tax base responses have also 
observed the organizational form to respond to corporate taxation. Da Rin, Di Giacomo and 
Sembenelli (2011) have studied the organizational form responses to CIT. They study 
entrepreneurship, firm entry and corporate income taxation using European data and find that 
corporate income taxation has a significant negative effect on entry rates, which measure the 
ratio of number of firms entering the industry to the number of active incumbents in the 
industry. They argue that for low levels of taxation the biggest driving force for the effect is the 
distortion in the organizational form. In their most preferred specification a reduction in the 
corporate tax rate from 30.08% to 27.57% implies a 0.88 percentage point (i.e. 12.5%) 
increase in the (mean) entry rate. This relative change in the entry rate is obviously much 
larger than the corresponding change in the tax base.10 The organizational form has been 
observed to be responsive to other taxes too. Elschner (2013) studies the effects of a special 
tax, a tonnage tax, on the organizational form. She finds that firms respond to the tax incentive 
in their organizational form structure. In particular, firms organize as pass-through firms 
(receiving full tax relief) when tonnage tax is available to all firms. 
As the second behavioral margin DE consider the CIT-induced distortion between debt and 
equity financing. Debt financing is typically tax-favored relative to equity financing, because 
the interest on debt is deductible in many countries, whereas the return on equity is not. In 
section 3 we showed with our stylized model that in this case the cost of capital for equity-
financed investment is higher than the cost of debt. Because of this favoritism, a higher CIT 
rate increases incentives for debt financing compared to equity financing and thus some of 
what would otherwise be equity financing may take the form of debt financing. This distortion 
is likely to erode the CIT base. 
                                                            
9 Another way to describe the tax base responses and the corresponding degrees of self-financing of the 
tax change would be by providing a range of estimates. Because the estimates vary a lot, we do not 
concentrate on the estimates of neither end of the range, but focus on providing those estimates that 
are considered to be the most likely ones in the literature. 
10 Entering firms are just a fraction of all firms, they might be smaller than firms on average and not all 
of these firms are profitable. 
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The empirical models employed in estimating the semi-elasticity ߝ஽ா  use tax parameters 
(simulated, statutory or average tax rates) to explain the debt-equity ratio (or debt-to-asset 
ratio).  The estimates reviewed in DE vary between −0.25 and −0.4. Based on these estimates 
DE adapt their estimate for the semi-elasticity to −0.3 (ߝ஽ா = −0.3). Huizinga, Laeven and 
Nicodème (2008) employ a firm-level dataset of European multinationals and divide the overall 
semi-elasticity (due to the debt-equity distortion) into a domestic leverage effect and an 
international debt-shifting effect and report semi-elasticities of −0.18  and −0.12 
respectively.11 They suggest harmonizing top CIT rates internationally in order to eliminate 
international debt-shifting and argue that otherwise the international debt-shifting remains an 
important policy for multinationals worldwide. DE conclude that the debt-equity response 
matters only for normal returns on capital and not for economic rents, because only normal 
returns on capital are distorted by the corporate income taxes. DE assume that the share of 
normal returns is one half (ݓே = 0.5). Thus the tax base response due to financial distortion is 
−0.15 (ݓேߝ஽ா = −0.15). 
Some research on the financial margin has been conducted after DE. Graham (2011) argues 
that the effect of the tax rate on debt is moderate (a 10 percentage points higher tax rate 
leads to 0.7	 percent higher debt usage) and that an increase in debt (extra debt) does not 
increase the probability of encountering distress, although in theory higher debt rates in firms 
might make them more vulnerable to downturns in the economy. De Mooij (2011) reviews the 
tax elasticity of corporate debt and reports that a one percentage point higher CIT rate 
increases the debt-asset ratio by between 0.17 and 0.28. He also concludes that debt bias 
distortions have become more important over time. Feld, Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) 
provide a recent review of the empirical literature on the impact of CIT on debt financing. They 
combine 48 previous studies and find a substantial impact, with a predicted marginal tax effect 
on the debt ratio of about 0.27, which means that a 10 percentage point increase in the 
marginal tax rate (e.g. from 25% to 35%) increases the debt-to-asset ratio by 2.7 percentage 
points (e.g. from 0.6 to 0.627). Their study also shows that the estimated effect is typically 
bigger when using simulated marginal tax rates than when using statutory tax rates. 
Johannesen (2014) contributes to the literature on the capital structure of MNEs by 
introducing a theoretical framework for hybrid instruments, which are treated as equity in one 
country and debt in another. He shows that firms can avoid taxes on investment by using a 
cross-border hybrid instrument. 
Some solutions to the debt-equity tax bias have been suggested. Devereux (2012) suggests an 
allowance for corporate equity (ACE) as a solution for removing the debt-favoring feature of 
tax systems. Fatica, Hemmelgarn and Nicodème (2012) discuss the consequences of and 
solutions to the debt-equity tax bias. They argue that the welfare reductions may be even 
larger than what has been found in the literature (0.08 – 0.25 percent of GDP) and that ACE or 
Business Enterprise Income Tax (BEIT) or a combination of these may provide suitable 
                                                            
11 Therefore the financing margin is also related to the profit-shifting margin discussed later. Part of the 
debt-equity ratio change may also be observed in the profit-shifting margin. 
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solutions to this tax bias. They also conclude that these solutions have not been acted upon in 
very many countries. 
The third component in the DE decomposition captures the CIT base erosion due to profit 
shifting. This activity where the profits are taken from high-tax countries to low-tax countries 
has been debated a lot and multiple ways for profit shifting have been observed. These include 
tax-favorable distortion of intra-firm transfer prices, relocation of patents or other profitable 
assets (licencing) and inter-company debt. The discussion of the profit shifting in the 
theoretical context is given in section 3. 
The empirical estimation of income-shifting mostly employs the approach of Hines and Rice 
(1994), where the logarithm of pretax profits of multinational affiliates (where pretax income 
is considered to be the sum of true income and shifted income) is regressed on the tax 
incentive parameter (tax rate differential across countries). Hines and Rice (1994) employ 
country-level macro data and find a semi-elasticity of −2.25, which is much larger, in absolute 
terms, than observed in the more recent empirical literature, which uses new and richer 
sources of data. For example, Huizinga and Laeven (2008) employ firm-level data and report 
the overall semi-elasticity of −1.31. In addition to firm-level estimations they also conduct 
aggregate-level estimations, analogous to Hines and Rice, and find a much smaller estimate. 
They conclude that the difference might arise because Hines and Rice include many non-
European tax havens in their analysis. Huizinga and Laeven (2008) also report country-specific 
semi-elasticity estimates. For Finland this estimate is −0.58.  DE refer to the review article of 
De Mooij (2005) and adopt a tax base semi-elasticity of −2.0 (ߝ௉ௌ = −2.0) due to profit-
shifting. The share of profits made by multinational firms is 60 percent in Europe (ݓெ = 0.6). 
Thus they conclude that the impact on the CIT base from profit-shifting is −1.2  (ݓெߝ௉ௌ =
−1.2). 
Dharmapala (2014) provides a more recent review of base erosion and profit-shifting (BEPS). 
He concludes that a representative consensus estimate for the semi-elasticity from the 
literature, based on a meta-regression study by Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013), is −0.8. This 
means that a 10 percentage point increase in the tax rate differential between an affiliate and 
its parent would increase the pretax income reported by the affiliate by 8 percent. This 
estimate is much smaller, in absolute terms, than the −2.0 reported in DE. Dharmapala (2014) 
also concludes that more recent literature, which uses new and richer (micro) data, reports 
smaller estimates than earlier literature. The reduction in the magnitude of estimates may be 
because firm-level micro data allows for controlling country-specific and industry-specific 
factors. Although the estimates using the Hines-Rice approach have decreased over time, this 
may just reflect that the measurement of the effect has become more precise. Clausing (2009), 
Grubert (2012) and Klassen and LaPlante (2012) report evidence of an increase in income-
shifting among multinational U.S. firms. 
Profit-shifting is observed to take multiple different forms. One of these is via the choice of 
location of the firm. Voget (2011) studies relocations of headquarters in the context of 
international taxation. There are two clear incentives for multinationals to relocate their 
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headquarters across borders. First, multinationals have an incentive to avoid controlled foreign 
company (CFC) rules that constrain their ability to defer taxes and shift profits within the 
group. The empirical results support this hypothesis as they indicate that the presence of CFC 
legislation increases the probability of relocating headquarters.12 Second, multinationals from 
tax credit (unlike exempt) countries have an incentive to avoid residual taxes on their foreign-
source dividends. The results show that the additional tax due in the home country upon 
repatriation of foreign profits has a positive effect on the probability of relocation: an increase 
in the repatriation tax by 10 percentage points would raise the share of relocating 
multinationals by 2.2 percentage points.13 Barrios et al. (2012) study international taxation and 
multinational firm location decisions. They show that both host and additional parent country 
taxation have a negative impact on the location decisions of MNEs. The marginal effect is 
between -0.6 and -0.9. Dishinger, Knoll and Riedel (2013) study the role of headquarters in 
multinational profit-shifting strategies in Europe. They show that profit-shifting activity from 
subsidiaries to parents is larger when the parent has a lower corporate tax rate than the 
subsidiary, compared to cases where the parent’s tax rate is higher (profit-shifting towards the 
parent). 
One of the issues discussed in profit-shifting is the possibility of a multinational enterprise 
(MNE) shifting profits by distorting royalty prices between operating entities and the 
intangibles-owner. There are two special motives why from a firm perspective licensing 
provides an attractive way for profit shifting: patented technologies are considered to be 
drivers of future profits and they simultaneously constitute a major source of transfer-pricing 
opportunities, because the transfer-pricing process for patent-related royalty payments is 
often highly intransparent and therefore the arm's length prices for these royalty payments 
are commonly not available to tax authorities. Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) study the locations 
of patents and show that the CIT rate exerts a negative effect on the number of patent 
applications by a subsidiary. Griffith, Miller and O’Connell (2014) also consider the link 
between corporate tax rates and patent applications, but with a more flexible model which 
allows tax effects to vary across locations. They find that corporate tax rates are important 
determinants of location choice and that the unobserved heterogeneity in behavior is 
important for explaining location choices. 
Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) show that the dominant profit-shifting channels used by 
MNEs are transfer pricing and licensing (70%), not intra-firm debt (30%). Grubert and 
Altshuler (2013) evaluate a series of proposals for the reform of the U.S. system of taxing 
cross-border corporate income. They emphasize the importance of parent-developed 
intangibles and their role in shifting income from the United States. They find that a per-
country minimum tax with expensing would have many advantages with respect to the 
multiple margins they consider. 
                                                            
12 Ruf and Weichenrieder (2012, 2013) study the effects of CFC rules and report a semi-elasticity of 77%. 
13 In the data 6 percent of MNEs have relocated headquarters within the last decade. 
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Fuest et al. (2013) provide illustrative examples of some observed sophisticated IP-based 
profit-shifting mechanisms14 and suggest policies to reduce profit-shifting. The profit-shifting 
mechanisms introduced employ the flaws and loopholes arising from inter-country differences 
in tax treatments. They conclude that unilateral measures on interest license deductions, 
fundamental reforms of the international tax system and country-to-country reporting should 
at least be elaborated before being introduced. In the short run they suggest extending 
withholding taxes in an internationally coordinated way. Their suggested long-run solution is a 
fundamental reform, like formulary apportionment or a destination-based tax.15 
The two last margins considered in the DE decomposition are extensive and intensive margins 
of investment. MNEs may choose the location (extensive margin) of their subsidiaries and the 
amount (intensive margin) to be invested in a given location. The extensive margin response 
depends on the effective average tax rate (EATR), whereas the intensive margin response 
depends on the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR). A short theoretical discussion is given in 
section 3. 
The effects are typically estimated by regressing a measure of foreign capital on a measure of 
the company tax burden. The impact of the corporate tax on investment can be seen as a 
result of two effects, the effect of corporate tax on the cost of capital and the effect of the cost 
of capital on investment. The effect of corporate tax on the cost of capital depends on the tax 
system (and is measured by EMTR)16 and the effect of the cost of capital on investment 
depends on the behavior of investors.17 
Based on the studies reviewed in DE they conclude that the semi-elasticity for the size of 
investment (intensive margin) is likely to be about −0.8 (ߝூே௏ = −0.8). As the share of normal 
returns in the corporate tax base is 0.5 (ݓே = 0.5), they conclude that the change in the tax 
base is −0.4 (ݓேߝூே௏ = −0.4) due to the intensive margin response. Their meta-analysis also 
shows that all the additional capital invested in response to a reduction in the cost of capital 
comes from abroad. 
According to the meta-analysis in DE the semi-elasticity of the extensive margin (location) is 
−3.2 (ߝ௅ை஼ = −3.2).18  Using the foreign ownership of capital (of European firms) reported in 
                                                            
14 They call these mechanisms the ”Double Irish Dutch Sandwich” and the “IP-Holding Structure”. The 
first of these takes advantage of four different tax legislations (US, Bermuda, Ireland and Netherlands). 
15 A comprehensive discussion of the destination-based tax is given in Auerbach and Devereux (2011). 
16 Firms are assumed to accumulate capital as long as the return on investment exceeds the cost of 
finance and depreciation. The cost of capital is then defined as the pre-tax rate of return on the marginal 
investment project. 
17 The effect of the cost of capital is derived in literature by direct and indirect methods. According to 
reviews of both the direct methods (Hassett and Hubbard 2002) and the indirect methods (Chirinko 
2002) the investment elasticity of the cost of capital lies between -1/2 and -1. These are in line with the 
DE estimate for the intensive margin. 
18 The extensive margin result in DE is based on their meta-regression, where the semi-elasticity is 
explained by study characteristics. The result is based on estimations using the count data for the 
number of locations. They also provide corresponding numbers for financial data, but here the impact of 
EATR on financial data captures both extensive and intensive investment. In order to disentangle the 
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Huizinga and Nicodeme (2006) (the share of assets owned by foreigners; ݓி = 0.2), the semi-
elasticity of the tax base via discrete location choices is −0.65 (ݓிߝ௅ை஼ = −0.65). 
Feld and Heckemeyer (2011; FH) provide a recent meta-analysis of FDI and taxation. They 
extend the DE analysis by including more publications, additional meta-regressors and a 
structural strategy to choose among meta-regression models. They report a median tax semi-
elasticity of FDI of 2.49 in absolute value. The mean semi-elasticity is 3.35, which is 
comparable with DE, whose corresponding mean is 3.3. FH show that there is a publication 
bias in the published estimates.19 Taking the publication bias into account reduces the 
estimates to between 2.28 and 1.19. DE and FH share the conclusion that discrete location 
decisions are more responsive than continuous investments. FH also find that the more recent 
studies have reported on the average larger semi-elasticities than the earlier ones. However, 
this observed pattern may be attributable to increased capital mobility or improved economic 
techniques. Diamond, Zodrow and Carroll (2013) argue that the sensitivity of FDI to the CIT 
rate has increased over time. 
In summary, the DE results suggest that the biggest tax base reactions in corporate income 
taxes take place along the profit-shifting and international investment channels. Their results 
suggest that a one percentage point decrease in each tax measure will increase the CIT base by 
1.2 percent due to the change in profit-shifting, by 1.05 percent due to changes in investment, 
by 0.7 percent due to changes in the organizational form and by 0.15 percent due to changes 
in financial choices. 
If each tax measure decreased by one percentage point as a consequence of a one percentage 
point decrease in the corporate tax rate, the effects via different channels would imply in total 
a 3.1 percent increase in the CIT base. This result would require all tax measures to increase by 
one percentage point and there to be no interactions between responses. However, not all the 
tax measures typically change by one percentage point as a response to a one percentage 
point change in the corporate income tax rate and, for instance, the financing margin (debt-
equity ratio) is also related to the profit-shifting margin as part of the debt-equity ratio change 
may also be observed in the profit shifting margin.20 
Finland experienced a change in its CIT rate from 24.5% to 20% in the beginning of 2014. This 
change would suggest a decrease of 4.5 percentage points in a static tax revenue calculation, 
where the tax base is kept unchanged. Taking the tax base responses into account changes the 
tax revenue calculation substantially. According to DE, if all tax measures followed the change 
in the CIT tax of 4.5 percentage points, the tax base would increase by about 14 percent 
                                                                                                                                                                              
extensive margin response from the intensive margin response, DE use count data results. The financial 
data responses to EATR are larger than the count data responses. 
19 They also show that studies with aggregate-level data report semi-elasticities that are on average 1.8 
units higher than those studies that employ firm-level data. 
20 The results are derived using multiple tax measures, like relative tax measures between corporate 
taxation and personal taxation, simulated tax rates, statutory tax rates, tax differentials between 
countries, effective marginal tax rates (EMTR) and effective average tax rates (EATR). For a given change 
in the CIT rate, not all the mentioned tax measures change by the same amount. 
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(0.031*4.5=0.1395). The dynamic tax revenue calculation implies a tax revenue decrease of 
1.7 percentage points ((0.245 − (0.245 − 0.045) ∗ (1 + 0.031 ∗ 4.5) = 	0.0171), instead of 
the 4.5 percentage points suggested by the static calculation. Thus, in this case, more than 60 
percent of the tax revenue decrease is offset by the behavioral responses.21 
The above calculation of tax base change is relative to what would have happened to the 
Finnish corporate income tax base in the absence of its own tax rate change. Even in the 
absence of this change Finnish corporate income tax base might have changed, for instance, 
due to actions taken by other countries. Therefore, the tax base changes observed in 
forthcoming years are to be considered only partly due to CIT rate change. 
A possible caveat for the above calculation is that for Finland the CIT base responses to the CIT 
rate might differ from those reviewed in DE. First, the organizational form response for Finland 
might be closer to the average response in European Union countries (−1.0 in De Mooij and 
Nicodème, 2008) rather than in the US states.22 Second, according to a recent review by 
Dharmapala (2014), the consensus estimate for the profit-shifting response is likely to be close 
to the −0.8 reported in Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013), not −2.0 as reported in DE. 
Furthermore, Huizinga and Laeven (2008) provide a point estimate of −0.58 for Finland. Third, 
Feld and Heckemeyer (2011) report slightly smaller investment responses (between 2.28 and 
1.19 after taking the publication bias into account) than DE. By using these new estimates we 
get the result that about 50 percent of the tax revenue decrease is offset by the behavioral 
responses.23 
In the above we reviewed the effects of the CIT rate change on CIT base by using a 
decomposition of various response margins. To be valid these results would require all tax 
measures to increase by one percentage point and there to be no interactions between 
responses. In order our results not to be subject to these possible problems, we will next 
consider two other branches of literature studying the same issue, but which are not subject to 
same possible problems. The first of these branches estimates the CIT base responses 
straightforwardly without the decomposition and the second one employs a multiperiod 
macroeconomic setting. If these different ways provide the same results for the semi-elasticity 
and the degree of self-financing, the possible problems in the decomposition should not play a 
role. 
Even if the literature on particular responses to corporate taxation is extensive, only a few 
studies have estimated the elasticity of corporate taxable income. Gruber and Rauh (2007) 
study this elasticity by using accounting-based data on publicly traded US firms. They find that 
the elasticity of the corporate tax base with respect to the corporate tax rate is -0.2. Dwenger 
and Steiner (2012) employ German corporate tax return data and find an elasticity of -0.5 (this 
                                                            
21 The fraction that is offset by the behavioral responses can be calculated as 3.1 ∗
(CIT	rate	– 	0.045)	.Thus the amount of offsetting depends on the original level of the CIT rate. 
22 DE base their estimate for this response (−0.7) on the average of the responses in the European 
Union countries (−1.0) and the US states (−0.4). 
23 According to the new estimates tax base increase is slightly over 11 percent and the corresponding 
offsetting is 0.2 ∗ (1.0 + 0.15 + 0.48 + 0.4 + 0.46) = 0.498. 
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equals 0.6 when considering the elasticity of the w.r.t. net-of-tax rate), which is more than 
twice the Gruber and Rauh (2007) estimate. They conclude that a reduction in the corporate 
tax rate is roughly one-half self-financing. This is in line with our self-financing calculations 
above. Devereux, Liu and Loretz (2014) employ UK tax records to study the elasticity of the 
taxable income w.r.t. net-of-tax rate. They find that for owner-managed companies the 
elasticity is between 0.53 and 0.56 and for widely held companies between 0.13 and 0.17. 
They estimate the corresponding marginal deadweight costs to be 29% and 6% respectively. 
In addition to the tax base responses studied in DE, the growth effects of corporate income 
taxes have also been studied. Arnold et al. (2011) conduct research which aims to compare the 
effect of different types of taxation on the recovery from the crisis and on economic growth. 
They conclude that corporate income taxes are the most harmful for economic growth. This 
might be because corporate income taxes affect investment (as seen above), which is one of 
the key drivers of economic growth. 
Although the above discussion has concentrated on the dynamic effects of corporate taxation 
in a single period, a few studies have employed multi-periodic settings to study the effects of 
CIT. Romer and Romer (2010) study the impact of tax changes on economic activity. They use 
narrative records to identify those legislated changes that are not likely to be related to 
economic conditions. By using these changes they find substantial effects, much larger than in 
earlier studies. They find that a 1 percent increase in the tax rate decreases GDP by 3 percent. 
Mertens and Ravn (2013) study the dynamic effects of personal and corporate taxes by using 
the narrative records suggested by Romer and Romer (2010). Consistent with DE, they find 
that an immediate impact of a 1 percentage point cut in the average corporate tax rate on the 
corporate tax base is about 3 percent. Despite this response they find that corporate taxes 
have little impact on U.S. corporate tax revenue. A one percentage point cut in the average 
corporate income tax rate (ACITR) raises real GDP per capita on impact by 0.4 percent and by 
0.6 percent after one year. This may illustrate loopholes in the corporate tax system or 
arrangements for taxable incomes as part of tax planning by firms.  
Both single-period and multi-period studies are shown to provide evidence of CIT base 
responses to the CIT rate. From these responses, which take place along multiple different 
channels, the profit-shifting and investment channels are observed to be the most important 
for the tax base. Importantly, these responses affect not only the country’s own tax base but 
also other countries’ tax bases. 
The interaction between tax bases across countries provides an incentive for governments to 
choose their CIT rates strategically. A CIT rate cut by a single country is likely to increase its 
own tax base, but decreases the tax bases of other countries. Because of this interactive 
feature, an individual country is likely to take into account the CIT rate considerations of other 
countries when considering its own CIT rate. This interactive behavior is also observed in the 
literature. Devereux and Loretz (2013) provide evidence of strategic behavior between 
governments in choosing their corporate income tax rates. 
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If all countries cut their CIT rates, these would tend to zero.24 However, there are also some 
arguments for why corporate income taxation should not be taken to zero. One argument 
against a zero CIT rate is its role as a backstop for personal income tax. Otherwise much of 
otherwise non-corporate activity would be channeled via corporations. The other argument 
against taking CIT rates to zero, is that tax competition is shown to be harmful and tax 
coordination useful (Feld and Heckemeyer (2011) and Fuest, Huber and Mintz (2005)). Huizinga 
and Laeven (2008) estimate the costs of profit-shifting to be 0.6 percent of the tax base. Fatica, 
Hemmelgarn and Nicodème (2012) conclude that the debt-equity financing bias may cause 
welfare reductions, which may be more than 0.25 percent of GDP. 
Our discussion has concentrated purely on CIT base changes, leaving out all other tax base 
changes. For instance, changing the organizational form from entrepreneurship to an 
incorporated business is likely to increase the CIT base, while at the same time reducing the 
personal income tax base. Thus some of the distortion margins may also affect other tax bases 
within the country. If the CIT base change is compensated (partially) by an opposite change in 
some other tax base, the predicted change in government tax revenue is likely to be smaller 
than what the pure CIT base calculation would suggest. However, those channels observed to 
react the most, profit-shifting and FDI, are not likely to produce a compensating effect in other 
national tax bases. 
To our knowledge, there is no research about how much of the CIT base changes are 
compensated in other tax bases. These compensating effects would be an interesting avenue 
for future research. 
In addition to changes in the corporate tax base, the changes in the corporate income tax rate 
may also induce equilibrium effects in the economy. These may be accounted for in 
macroeconomic models that include changes in other aspects as well, like changes in prices, 
wages, working hours, consumption and so on. In this study we concentrate only on corporate 
tax base responses and leave all other such effects aside. 
  
                                                            
24 There is also a general discussion on capital taxation. The focus of this discussion is not specifically 
related to corporate taxation, but on more general issues. Some known theoretical results support a tax 
system where the capital income is not taxed at all. Banks and Diamond (2010) provide a comprehensive 
discussion on the reasoning underlying these results of no capital income taxation. Mankiw, Weinzierl 
and Yagan (2009) employ the theoretical arguments and conclude that taxation of capital income ought 
to be avoided. Based on these arguments they also provide guidelines for a practical level of capital 
taxation. In contrast, Diamond and Saez (2011) provide a recommendation, which supports positive 
taxation of capital income. They find that those studies which imply no capital income taxation, and 
which Mankiw, Weinzierl and Yagan (2009) rely on, are not robust enough to be policy-relevant. Some 
more detailed models suggest that rents should be taxed, yet the income below normal return should 
not be taxed. 
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5 Summary and conclusions 
 
We have provided a literature review of corporate income taxation. This rapidly expanding 
literature is covered in our review up until early 2014. The literature includes micro-level 
studies on number of margins that are observed to respond to corporate income taxation as 
well as both micro-level and macro-level studies on the overall corporate tax base responses. 
From a government perspective these tax base responses are of great importance, because 
they deflect tax revenue from that suggested by a static budget calculation. 
Of the multiple decision margins that have been observed to respond to corporate income 
taxation, profit-shifting and investment decisions are the most important for the corporate 
income tax base of a country. These margins are also internationally the most relevant ones, 
because they make the corporate tax bases interact across countries. A corporate income tax 
cut is likely to increase the corporate tax base in the home country, yet is likely to decrease 
corporate tax bases abroad. Thus a reduction in the tax revenue is partially offset by a larger 
tax base. One part of this offsetting is, however, at the expense of other countries, the other 
part is at the expense of country’s own other tax bases. The interaction between countries’ tax 
bases encourages countries into strategic considerations and possibly to cut their corporate 
tax rates. Both of these have also been observed empirically. 
Finland implemented a change in the corporate income tax rate from 24.5% to 20% in the 
beginning of 2014. According to empirical estimates shown in the literature, about 50% of the 
tax revenue decrease following this tax rate cut is likely to be offset by behavioral responses. 
This tax base change is relative to what would have happened to Finnish corporate income tax 
base in the absence of the tax rate change. As a caveat, we point out that the empirical 
estimates are only approximations of the true effects and these may also differ across 
countries. Some new results are also now available and not all of them were available when 
the decision of the Finnish corporate income tax rate cut was made. 
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